Royal Institute of Navigation, European Navigation Conferences on GNSS, PNT Co-Locate Virtually in November

Royal Institute of Navigation, European Navigation Conferences on GNSS, PNT Co-Locate Virtually in November

The European Navigation Conference and the Royal Institute of Navigation’s (RIN’s) International Navigation Conference are one and the same in 2021. They convene jointly and virtually as Navigation 2021, from November 15 to 18.

The themes of Navigation 2021 bring together diverse disciplines to stimulate insights and knowledge sharing towards a more navigable world:

PNT Systems & Technology

Navigation In The Space Environment And Space Segment Developments

Robust & Resilient PNT

Applications of PNT

Animal And Human Navigation

PNT In Society

Participants come from across government, academia, industry and all PNT sectors. The Call for Papers is now open via rin.org.uk/Navigation2021.

The conference will be held virtually using RIN’s interactive platform, which will enable delegates to make new contacts and exchange ideas beyond the talks. If possible, an in-person element will be added as an option during 2021.

Navigation and timing are critical to the world we all inhabit. The RIN believes that the work of the wider navigation community enables societal benefit including support to national grand challenges as well as the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. To achieve this requires collaboration and understanding across science, technology and practice.

The RIN invites all in the PNT community to visit rin.org.uk/Navigation2021 and contribute to Navigation 2021 to open minds, share ideas and build knowledge and understanding.

University revises PNT backgrounder In response to concerns - GPS World

George Mason University has revised a briefing paper on positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) in response to concerns about its accuracy.

The university’s National Security Institute “NSI Backgrounder — Beyond GPS: The Frontier of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services” was first issued on Dec. 2. Some staff on Capitol Hill and members of industry soon had concerns about several of its assertions.

Responding to letters from industry, National Security Institute (NSI) Executive Director and Professor Jamil Jaffer said he determined that three of the issues raised, while not fatal to the document, warranted clarification.

ELoran callout. The first was a statement in the backgrounder that the National Timing Resilience and Security Act (NTRSA) “specifies 13 technical requirements for a GPS backup, which essentially define the eLoran system.”

This was a concern to some on the hill as Congress is generally reluctant to specify solutions. Legislators prefer to specify outcomes and then defer to the executive branch on how to make them happen.

Members of industry pointed out that government systems like WWVB and the low-frequency portion of DARPA’s STOIC program, as well as commercial systems like NextNav and Locata, could meet or be adapted to meet the NTRSA requirement.

The revised backgrounder says the NTRSA “specifies 13 mainly technical requirements for a GPS back-up, which align closely with the capabilities of the eLoran system. Other systems may meet the Act’s requirements to varying degrees.”

Multiple technologies. The revised backgrounder also corrects a statement that the NTRSA requires the Department of Transportation to establish an eLoran system. It now says “a system that complies with the Act, and DOT may pursue multiple technologies in implementing the Act.”

Department officials had previously said they were taking a system-of-systems approach and expected to employ multiple technologies. Subsequently, a DOT report was released that documents the need for several diverse systems. It lists transmissions using low frequency (eLoran, STOIC), ultra high frequency (NextNav, Locata) and L-band from space (GPS, Satelles). It also says the terrestrial transmitters should be interconnected by fiber.

Public-private partnership. A third correction was made in the document to reflect how the Congressional Budget Office regarded the possibility of using a public-private partnership in previously proposed legislation.

Members of industry also expressed concern that one of the authors of the document serves on the advisory board for Satelles Inc. and that this was not disclosed in the paper. The backgrounder appeared on the Satelles website the same day it was published.

The university concluded that such disclosure was not necessary as the paper said the author “provides advisory services to industry, including in the PNT area.” At the author’s request, though, his profile on NSI’s webpage will be updated to show his relationship with Satelles.

2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT - GPS World

Senate joined House to override Trump’s veto, making bill into law

The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) issues. Over the past two decades, Congressional hearings, demands for reports and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

GPS Under Threat

Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several factors that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

Military Multi-GNSS Prototype

The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Resilient, Survivable PNT

Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

Section 1611 of the act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems…”

The act also addresses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “…to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

Responding to Ligado Decision

By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order that the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing, saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

Among its provisions, the act:

requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.

prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado).

prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services.

requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.

Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation (rntfnd.org).